Abstract. DNS Tunnels are built by proper tools that allow embedding data on DNS queries and responses. Each tool has its own strategies that affect the network performance in a unique way. In this paper, we propose an architectural analysis of the current state-of-the-art of DNS Tunneling tools. Then, we provide a comparative evaluation of such tools in term of performance, as a first step towards the possibility to relate each tool with a specific pattern of the DNS traffic. To this aim, we define an assessment of the tools in three different network configurations based on three performance metrics. We finally analyze the testing results and provide a first characterization of the performance of each tool.
Introduction
In the last years, the spread of wired and wireless connectivity has taken organizations to the adoption of mechanisms (e.g. firewalls, captive portals) aimed at controlling the user's access to Internet. In general, such mechanisms act as filters for some network protocols (e.g. HTTP, FTP) while they often allow the transit of service protocols (DNS, ICMP) and are not generally able to filter ciphered ones (e.g. HTTPS, Skype). In this context, a straight way to overcome the restrictions of firewalls is to embed data of filtered protocols inside packets of service or ciphered protocols. To this regard, many research activities [1] [2] [3] have been focused on hiding data into various network protocols like IPv4, IPv6, TCP, ICMP, HTTP and HTTPS, building the so-called covert channels.
At present, a particularly interesting covert channel is the DNS tunnel, since DNS protocol is seldom filtered by security mechanisms of organizations. For instance, when dealing with a captive portal, if an unauthenticated user tries to connect to an external site, the captive portal solves the DNS query before requesting credentials to the user, thus delivering DNS traffic on Internet. Therefore, each user within the network can produce DNS traffic to reach a destination over the Internet, long before being authenticated or recognized by the system. The potential use of DNS queries as covert channels had taken to the development of proper DNS Tunneling tools aimed at hiding information inside the DNS requests/responses, using a customized client on the user machine, and a colluded DNS server outside the organization in a destination domain. A DNS Tunneling tool embeds data in DNS queries and delivers DNS requests and responses between the tunneled client and a rogue DNS server, exchanging data through proper fields of DNS packets. The rogue server forwards the received data to another destination client.
Fig. 1. Entities involved in a DNS Tunnel
Each DNS Tunneling tool adopts its own strategies in order to build tunnels between the client and the rogue server, resulting in covert channels that can show heterogeneous characteristics, and have different impact on the performance of network and honest DNS servers.
Therefore, the possibility to correlate some specific performance patterns to a given tool would be useful in detection systems (e.g. IDS) for recognizing DNS tunnels built with such tools. To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive and deep performance evaluation of all the current state-of-the-art in DNS tunneling tools has not been made. The aim of this paper is to propose a first attempt to compare distinct DNS Tunneling tools by characterizing their performance and the impact they have on the network. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 points out the related works on convert channels and, in particular, on DNS tunnels; Section 3 provides an introduction to current DNS Tunneling Tools. Section 4 introduces the testing network architecture, the network scenarios (i.e. proper configurations of the general architecture) and the metrics we used in our tests. Section 5 provides the analysis of the results and a characterization of each tool in term of network performance. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Works
Due to the growing proliferation of covert channels, the research activity has been focused on recognize unexpected patterns [7] or hidden information in plain and ciphered network protocols. Plain protocols (e.g. HTTP) can be exploited to build covert channels. For instance, SSH can use HTTP to force the restriction of a firewall. In [4] , HTTP traffic is analyzed in order to recognize covert channels built by Skype protocols. The proposed solution is feasible for real-time Skype detection over HTTP, providing a very low percentage of false positive. On ciphered networks, studies are focused on categorizing communication patterns of ciphered traffic by evaluating only features and metrics that are not affected by encryption. For instance, in [8] a methodology for recognizing application level protocols embedded on ciphered TCP channels is presented. Similarly, in [5] two techniques for traffic analysis based on classification algorithms are used for retrieving web sites identities in ciphered HTTPS traffic. In general, the information leakage in ciphered protocols is a sensitive problem: in [6] , authors investigate how the behavior of anonymity systems (e.g. Tor) could take to an unwanted reduction of the real level of anonymity, allowing an attacker to discover information on the network location of the client. Regarding the DNS protocol, it has been deeply investigated in order to monitor and detect attacks to single DNS servers and to the network of servers. In [9] monitoring algorithms are proposed for detecting attacks to DNS servers (e.g. cache poisoning). In the same article, a methodology for detecting DNS Tunneling is provided. To this regard, in [10] a statistical approach based on the analysis of the frequencies of characters in DNS request is provided: the idea is that characters in DNS tunnels have an evenly distributed frequency while in normal language (and so, real DNS query), the frequency follows the Zipf's law. Previous studies do not consider variations of performance due to the existence of DNS Tunneling in comparison to DNS traffic without tunnels. However, some early studies have been made under this perspective. In [11] the impact of DNS Tunnels on network performance is assessed but the study is limited to DNS tunnels built with DNSCat only; therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of the stateof-the-art is still missing. We argue that our study may be useful as a first step for the development of optimized Intrusion Detection Systems (e.g. [24] , [25] , [26] ) aiming at recognizing DNS Tunnels.. However, further studies, specific on IDS strategies and algorithms must be made, in order to define effective DNS-tunnel oriented IDS strategies.
DNS Tunneling Tools
Existing DNS Tunneling tools can be divided into two classes, depending on the abstraction layer at which the information is encapsulated. The main part of DNS Tunneling tools is aimed at building IP over DNS tunnels, namely encapsulating IP packets inside DNS queries:  NSTX [13] has been the first tool to realize IP over DNS. To encode data into queries, it uses a non-compliant Base64 encoding (adding the character ``_'' to the 63 characters allowed by the DNS RFC). Tunnels are realized on tun0 interface and replies are encoded into TXT records. NSTX requires a rogue server running the NSTX tool. It also requires the client and server to have special kernel configurations.  DNSCat [14] consists of two small programs, a server and client, written in Java. It is a fast, efficient and highly configurable cross platform tool. The tunnel is made through the interface ppp0 and data in replies are encapsulated in the CNAME record. In comparison to NSTX, it does not need special kernel configuration. Thus, DNSCat is more flexible than NSTX.  Iodine [15] is a recent project. It uses either Base32 or a noncompliant Base64 encoding to encode the data (the choice is configurable). Replies are sent using NULL records. NULL records are described in RFC 1035 [5] section 3.3.10 as a container for any data, up to 65535 bytes long. It is used as a placeholder in some experimental DNS extensions. Additionally, Iodine uses EDNS0, a DNS extension that allows using DNS packets longer than the 512-byte as originally proposed in RFC 1035. Both NSTX and Iodine split IP packets into several DNS packets and send them separately. IP packets are resembled at the endpoint (in a way similar to IP fragmentation).  TUNS [12] is a new-coming tool. It works exclusively on UNIX-like systems (clients and servers) and encapsulates data in CNAME field. In comparison to NSTX and Iodine, it does not split IP packets in smaller DNS packets. TUNS client polls periodically the rogue server with short queries. TUNS avoids duplicated queries, made by DNS servers, using a cache. TUNS works on a wide range of networks.
In TCP over DNS tunnels, only packets that use TCP as transport protocol are encapsulated in the tunnel. We considered Dns2TCP [16], a tool able to encapsulate TCP packets over DNS tunnels. Dns2TCP is composed by a server-side and a client-side part. The server has a list of resources; each resource is a local or remote service listening for TCP connection. The client listens on a predefined TCP port and relays each incoming connection to the final service using DNS. Information is encapsulated in the TXT field. Differently from the IP-over-DNS tools, there is not a periodic polling activity from the client side.
In our analysis, we also tried to test OzyManDNS [17] as an alternative to Dns2TCP. However, this tool has revealed to be too buggy and unreliable at the current state of development. We didn't test two other tools: Heyoka[22] and PSUDP [23] . These tools have a different architectural structure and thus it is hard to make a comprehensive performance evaluation; moreover, these tools are in alpha development state. In the near future we plan to define a method to allow a complete performance assessment also to those tools.
Testing Environment
Each tool has been tested using the network architecture depicted in fig. 2 . The four components (DNS tunnel client, local (honest) DNS server, remote (rogue) DNS tunnel server, final destination (external) server) are located on different networks linked by a firewall. This choice allowed us to better isolate and analyze the traffic flow during the testing phase. The DNS client executes the tunneling tool, building queries that are forwarded to the honest server; the honest server then queries the rogue one, which is authoritative for the fake domain. The latter in turns de-capsulates the information in the DNS queries and rebuilds the real flow. Then, it contacts the external server and delivers the extracted information. With the aim of separating effects on performance due to different causes, we tested tools using three different scenarios in the testing architecture:  Direct: the connection is made by the DNS client directly to the rogue server. Normally this configuration is unfeasible, since the firewall blocks outgoing direct connection to port 53. The plus is that tools can be tested independently from restrictions of DNS server (e.g. filtering on DNS records like NULL, TXT, EDNS0 extension), evaluating their behavior in an ideal environment.  Proxy: client is configured to use the honest server which forwards the queries to the rogue server. We expect a sensitive reduction of performances respect to Direct case, due to server restrictions (on types and amount of queries) and traffic congestion. This is the real case scenario, far from ideal environment.  NAT: in the last scenario, the packets flow from the rogue server to the external one. In theory, this should be different from the proxy case, but we have seen that results are actually identical; this is due to the very small amount of effort for rogue server to act as a NAT device. Therefore we don't mention this case from now on, even if we performed experiments on it.
Performance Metrics
Three metrics are defined and computed on each scenario:
 Throughput: it assesses the bandwidth availability through the tunnel. We excluded jitter (variability over time of the packet latency across a network) as a performance metric. In fact, jitter is particularly relevant for VOIP and multimedia applications only, and it's not the focus of our paper.
Testing and Analysis of Results
We tested all network configurations in terms of all metrics. Each test has been repeated several times. The comparative analysis of performance has been carried out analytically, making investigation at a granularity of single packets with Wireshark [21] and extrapolating "useful" data.
Throughput

Fig. 3. Throughput in Direct configuration
Fig . 3 Throughput in the network without tunnels is about 80Mbps (not shown in Fig. 3 and 4 for scaling issues). It is independent from the architecture and the time intervals. It is directly noticeable that tools using TXT records (Dns2Tcp and NSTX) perform better than others. We would have expected that tools using NULL record (i.e. Iodine) have similar throughput, since they can use binary values (Raw mode) instead of base encoding to transport data inside queries. Moreover, packet size of NULL record could be greater than CNAME or TXT ones; however, such difference has not been noticed in our tests. See Iodine description below for explaination of this behaviour. TUNS has revealed to have the lowest throughput. This is due to the fact that it builds up a high number of small packets for service purpose; this overhead slows the entire communication, and, furthermore, it uses base32 for encoding. The highest throughput has been reached by the TCP over DNS tool (Dns2Tcp). We argue that is due to the fact that the effort required in the IP over DNS approach for building an IP interface (tun), encapsulating and managing tunneled data is greater than simple port forwarding in TCP over DNS. Besides, Iperf tests have been carried out using TCP channels, therefore it is expected that Dns2Tcp shows a better performance. . In comparison to the ideal configuration (Direct) we identified the following differences:  Dns2Tcp still achieve best performances (excellent during the transient in first time instants), but it suffers a performance drop after 20 sec; this is due to buffer capabilities of the real dns server, which is able to sustain a large number of dns requests but only in the transient. After this time the system goes in the stationary state.
 TUNS still shows the worst performance, and there are no significant changes in a real scenario (due to its intrinsic characteristics of being optimized for low-throughput degraded networks). However, this aspect is fundamental in order to keep the tunnel stealth and unrecognizable by an IDS.  Other tools, except NSTX, have a significant loss of performance as we expected, but throughput remains acceptable.  NSTX has an unexpected loss of performance due to the fact that it starts a burst of connections in a narrow time slice (thirty connections every one millisecond in peak activity). This behavior leads to overload the honest server that replies with DNS servfail (25% of total responses). Moreover this fact can be figured out from Fig. 3 where it is self-evident that in short time period traffic NSTX shows a peak in throughput (5,2 Mbps in 2 seconds of activity) due to the fact that no servfail responses occur.  We argue that Iodine has been optimized for behavior constance. In fact Iodine performance patterns are independent by network configuration, showing a constant throughput in all three configurations (these results could be achieved for example using a maximum number of dns queries per given amount of time). Moreover, further investigations on Iodine are required.
Round Trip Time
Fig . 5 shows the RTT of tools. The RTT with no tunnels is about 0.5 ms. Differently from other tools, TUNS shows an unusual aspect: RTT grows with the packet size. From our analysis, we argue that it is due to the fact that MTU interface is set to 120 byte therefore causing fragmentation and increasing with the packet size.
Fig. 5. RTT in Direct configuration
In Direct configuration, Dns2TCP shows a burst of request packets and corresponding delayed responses, due to the behavior of SSH where the building of the IP interface increases the total delay (see Section 4.1), arguably due to buffering mechanisms. DNSCat reveals to be inefficient for ping since it produces a high number of packets, caused by the use CNAME queries, the rogue server is forced to reply with the same record type; the first response is used for the numbering and the management of packet flow; the second one is used for tunneling data which are encapsulated exclusively in the A field which is only 4-byte long. Therefore, a huge amount of packets is generated. Also TUNS uses CNAME record, but, unlike DNSCat, it uses the text part of CNAME reply for tunneling data (overcoming the limitation of the A field). Iodine shows a good performance since it uses NULL record, encoding directly binary data, thus resulting in a reduced set of queries. Also NSTX has a good efficiency, due to the use of TXT record which provides much flexibility in data transfer and supports tunnel interfaces at IP level, without the need of additional layers (unlike Dns2TCP).
In Proxy configuration (Fig. 6 ) RTT of each tool is drastically increased compared to the Direct case. This is an expected behavior when using a DNS server; however, in the case of DNSCat and TUNS, the amount of performance reduction is beyond the limitations enforced by the proxy architecture.
We noticed that whether DNSCat interacts with a proxy server, it switches to a different strategy: in particular, it still uses CNAME queries for tunneling, but the response from rogue server contains only textual responses without the A field. Such strategy is justified for circumventing the honest dns constraints and checks, but it raises the number of packets required for exchanging a given amount of data, in comparison to the strategy adopted in the Direct case.
Fig. 6. RTT in Proxy configuration
This behavior -far from being considered negatively -demonstrates the great adaptability of the tool to different external conditions. In the Proxy configuration, the RTT of ICMP packets with a packet size of 1024 byte is higher than one second when using TUNS. Once again, this is due to IP fragmentation.
Overhead
Measuring the overhead allows assessing the efficiency of the strategies used for maintaining and managing the tunnel. Fig. 7 shows the amount of overhead (#total bytes/ #tunneled data bytes) using icmp packets with different payload sizes, on a semi-logarithmic scale in Proxy configuration. The dimension of captured files (also known as pcap) is almost invariant with the dimension of the payload. This fact witnesses that the main part of traffic is used for polling the rogue server rather than conveying data. All tests (also for Direct and NAT configurations) show a decreasing trend for almost each tool, which attests an efficient exploitation of the channel; this is an expected result, since a heavy channel usage decreases proportionally the management cost of the channel itself.
DNSCat has an overhead in the range of 63-1906 while others have an overhead included in the interval 1-20 (see Fig. 7 ), therefore showing an intensive usage of control management packets. 
Discussion of Results
The previous tests allow recognizing a unique set of characteristics for each tool in term of performance:
 Dns2Tcp. The TCP-over-Tunnel built with Dns2Tcp shows a higher throughput in comparison to the IP-over-DNS solutions and the RTT is acceptable. However, a tunnel made through Dns2Tcp could be recognized by the amount of traffic done (packet overhead around 1500%, in average).  NSTX. It shows the lower RTT in all IP-over-DNS tools but it has globally a low throughput. Moreover, since NSTX is not configurable, it cannot be customized for different scenarios and, thus, the throughput cannot be raised. A high throughput has been measured only in the Direct configuration, that is, as remarked, an unrealistic case.  DNSCat. It has an acceptable level of throughput and RTT, making it suitable for Internet surfing without sensitive delays. However, it is characterized by a high overhead. Differently from NSTX, it is a highly configurable tool, so the overhead can potentially be reduced by properly customizing the tool if the network configuration is known.
 Iodine. Iodine is the only tool showing a linear behavior in all metrics and all configurations. Notwithstanding the average throughput, Iodine shows the lower overhead and a low RTT value.
Since it is particularly configurable, it is suitable for almost all network scenarios. Probably it is the best tool for general purposes.  TUNS. It shows the worst performance in almost all configurations.
Throughput and RTT are too low and too high, respectively, making hard its use for building channels exploitable by real applications. However, it shows a good overhead value and, differently from the other tools, its performance and design characteristics make it particularly reliable in choke networks.
Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper we have comparatively analyzed the characteristics of the current state-of-the-art in DNS Tunneling tools, providing both a testing environment and global analysis of the whole set of results. Performance metrics have been established considering absolute performance (throughput), perceived response time (RTT), network overload (overhead). Such analysis has revealed useful for discovering the intrinsic behavior characteristics of each tool, laying the foundations for the development of a new set of logical rules for Intrusion Detection Systems able to recognize DNS tunnels in networks. These results are per se not enough to develop a complete IDS; instead they are useful in conjunction with other informations (statistical analysis for example). Further work will be developed in two different directions: i) definition of the complete detection methodology for DNS Tunnels and ii) the definition of appropriate metrics for assessing the performance of Voice Over IP applications in DNS tunnels.
